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Note
ARIZONA V. GANT: MISSING AN OPPORTUNITY TO BANISH
BRIGHT LINES FROM THE COURT’S VEHICULAR SEARCH
INCIDENT TO ARREST JURISPRUDENCE
JACK BLUM*
In Arizona v. Gant,1 the Supreme Court of the United States revisited a perennial issue regarding the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment: the circumstances under which law
enforcement may search a car whose occupant has been arrested.2
The Court held that a vehicle may be searched where the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the vehicle’s passenger
compartment when the search occurs.3 In addition, the Court, adopting the “evidence standard” first espoused by Justice Scalia in Thornton
v. United States,4 concluded that a vehicle may also be searched incident to its occupant’s arrest where it is reasonable to believe that the
vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest.5
In reaching this result, the Court curtailed the bright-line standard of New York v. Belton6 and endorsed a limited view of this exception to the Fourth Amendment that is more consistent with the
exigency-based approach espoused in Chimel v. California.7 Unfortunately, the Court also adopted Justice Scalia’s evidence standard,
which is itself a scaled back bright-line standard that will undermine
Chimel’s protections, making the Gant rule internally inconsistent.8 In
addition to being inconsistent with Chimel, the evidence standard conCopyright  2011 by Jack Blum.
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A., 2007, St. Mary’s
College. This Note is dedicated to the memory of L. Jack Rose, the author’s namesake,
role model, and grandfather. The author would like to thank Stephanie Bignon and the
other editors of the Maryland Law Review for their tremendous advice and support throughout the writing process.
1. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
2. Id. at 1714.
3. Id. at 1719.
4. 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I would therefore limit Belton searches to cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”).
5. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
6. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
7. 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see infra Part IV.A.
8. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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flicts with the Fourth Amendment’s historical foundation9 and is likely
to introduce further ambiguity and inconsistency10 into a doctrine
that has seen no shortage of either.11 Although it may have had to do
so through only a plurality opinion, the Court should have returned
the search incident to arrest exception in the vehicular context to
Chimel’s exigency-based rationale, which better accords with the
Fourth Amendment’s historical foundation.12
I.

THE CASE

This latest twist in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
arises out of the investigation of a suspected narcotics house, during
the course of which the police arrested Rodney Gant and searched his
car.13 Acting on a tip, the police first encountered Gant when they
knocked on the door of the house where narcotics activity was allegedly occurring, and Gant answered.14 Gant was not arrested at that
time; instead, the police, continuing their investigation, left the house
and ran a computer check on Gant’s name, discovering that he had a
suspended driver’s license and an outstanding warrant for his arrest.15
The police later returned to the house and encountered Gant for a
second time when he drove into the house’s driveway.16 As Gant entered the driveway, an officer shined a flashlight into the car and identified him.17 Gant parked and exited the vehicle, walking several feet
away before the officer confronted him.18 The officer took Gant into
custody for the outstanding warrant and for operating a motor vehicle
with a suspended driver’s license.19 After the officer had handcuffed
and secured Gant in a patrol car, two police officers performed a warrantless search of Gant’s vehicle, where they found a bag of cocaine
and a weapon.20
9. See infra Part IV.B.2.
10. See infra Part IV.B.3.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part IV.C.
13. State v. Gant, 43 P.3d 188, 190–91 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002), cert. granted, 538 U.S. 976,
and vacated, 540 U.S. 963 (2003).
14. Id. at 190.
15. Id. The warrant was for an unrelated failure to appear. Id.
16. Id. The police encountered two other individuals, whose presence was immaterial
to Gant’s arrest, outside the house during their second visit, one of whom was found to be
in possession of a crack pipe. Id.
17. Id.
18. State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 641 (Ariz. 2007), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
19. Gant, 43 P.3d at 190. Gant did not challenge the lawfulness of his arrest. Id. at 191.
20. Gant, 162 P.3d at 641.
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At trial, Gant sought to suppress the evidence discovered during
the search of his vehicle, arguing that no exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement justified the search, thus making it
illegal.21 The trial court denied Gant’s motion, finding that the
search fell under the search incident to arrest exception, and Gant
was convicted of unlawful possession of cocaine for sale and unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia.22 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
of Arizona relied heavily upon two United States Supreme Court decisions23: Chimel v. California, a landmark case defining the extent of the
search incident to arrest exception,24 and New York v. Belton, in which
the Court had determined how Chimel applies to an arrestee who is a
“recent occupant” of an automobile.25 The court of appeals held that
Belton did not justify the search of Gant’s vehicle because Gant had
voluntarily exited the vehicle before the officer initiated contact with
him, and accordingly Gant was not a recent occupant of the vehicle.26
The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted the State of
Arizona’s petition for certiorari.27
Prior to argument, however, the Supreme Court of Arizona decided the case of State v. Dean,28 in which it strongly criticized the

21. Gant, 43 P.3d at 191. The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. Gant, 43 P.3d at 190–91.
23. Id. at 191–94.
24. See 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (explaining that a search incident to arrest is only
justified where officer safety or evidence preservation is at issue).
25. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). In Chimel, the Court ruled that police could perform a
warrantless search incident to arrest of the area within an arrestee’s “immediate control”
when necessary to secure weapons or evidence, Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63, while in Belton,
the Court defined the area of “immediate control” in a vehicular arrest as the entirety of
the vehicle’s passenger compartment, including “the contents of any containers found
within” it, Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
26. Gant, 43 P.3d at 194.
27. Arizona v. Gant, 538 U.S. 976 (2003) (granting certiorari). Arizona appealed to
the United States Supreme Court after the Supreme Court of Arizona denied review of the
court of appeals’s decision without comment. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Gant, 538
U.S. 976 (No. 02-1019), 2002 WL 32101152, at *6.
28. 76 P.3d 429 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc). In Dean, the Court of Appeals of Arizona,
referencing its decision in State v. Gant, had found that the search of a defendant’s car was
reasonable because police had initiated contact with the defendant before he exited the
vehicle, even though the actual arrest took place in a different location more than two
hours after the defendant had exited the car. State v. Dean, 55 P.3d 102, 106 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2002), overruled by 76 P.3d 429.
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court of appeals’ analysis in State v. Gant.29 The Supreme Court of
Arizona decried the court of appeals’ “singular focus”30 on the time
when the police initiated contact with an arrestee and, instead, held
that occupancy is a function of when and where the arrest occurs relative to the vehicle.31 In addition, foreshadowing a doctrinal question
that would later be addressed by the United States Supreme Court,32
the Supreme Court of Arizona noted in dictum that neither of the two
exigency-based rationales set out by the United States Supreme Court
in Chimel—officer safety and evidence preservation—was present to
justify the search of Dean’s car.33
In light of Dean’s repudiation of State v. Gant’s reasoning, the
United States Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision in
Gant and remanded the case for reconsideration.34 The court of appeals proceeded to remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the legality of the search of Gant’s car.35 On remand,
the trial court found that Gant was a recent occupant of the vehicle
because police contacted him as he stepped out of the car and arrested him several feet away and again denied Gant’s motion to suppress.36 The court of appeals, echoing the Supreme Court of
Arizona’s dictum in Dean,37 reversed the trial court’s decision,38 this
time finding the search of Gant’s vehicle illegal because it was justified
by neither officer safety nor evidence preservation.39
The State appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Arizona,
which rejected the contention that Belton authorized the search of
29. Dean, 76 P.3d at 436. The Supreme Court of Arizona noted that since “[a] suspect
arrested next to a vehicle presents the same threat to officer safety and the same potential
for destruction of evidence whether or not he was alerted prior to arrest . . . [i]t makes no
sense to have two different rules applicable to . . . the same situation.” Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 436–37 (stating that the Belton rule applies “when [the defendant] is arrested
‘in close proximity to the vehicle immediately after the [defendant] exits the automobile’”
(second alteration in original) (quoting Glasco v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 137, 142
(Va. 1999))).
32. See infra Part III.
33. Dean, 76 P.3d at 437.
34. Arizona v. Gant, 540 U.S. 963 (2003) (vacating Gant for reconsideration in light of
Dean).
35. State v. Gant, 143 P.3d 379, 381 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz.
2007), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 1710 .
36. Id. (noting the trial court’s finding that “the ‘search was conducted immediately
after arrest,’ and Gant was arrested in ‘close proximity’ to his vehicle”).
37. Id. at 382.
38. Id. at 380.
39. Id. at 382 (“[O]ur analysis must be guided by the rationales underlying the search
incident to arrest exception . . . these rationales are absent under the circumstances
here.”).
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Gant’s vehicle.40 The court noted that Belton defined only the “permissible scope of the search,” but did not resolve the “threshold question” of whether any search could be lawfully conducted incident to
arrest when the scene had already been secured.41 The Supreme
Court of Arizona interpreted Belton narrowly, ruling that Belton did
not dispense with the requirement that one of the Chimel rationales of
officer safety or evidence preservation be present.42 Judge Bales, writing in dissent, noted that Justice Brennan, in his Belton dissent, “explicitly made the argument that the majority adopts here” but could
not persuade a majority of the Court to support his position.43 Conceding that “there may be good reasons to reconsider Belton,”44 Judge
Bales argued that Belton searches do not depend on whether a Chimel
rationale is present in a particular case.45 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether Belton authorizes warrantless searches of automobiles incident to arrest where the safety
and evidence rationales described in Chimel are absent.46
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement has a “checkered history.”47 Born as dictum, the exception expanded in both scope and authority during the
Prohibition era.48 The exception’s nascent years were filled with turmoil, as the Court at various times attempted to ground it in the oscillating rationales of exigent circumstances and evidence gathering.49
By the 1960s, it appeared that the exigency rationale had won the
40. State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 643 (Ariz. 2007), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) (reasoning that “Belton dealt with a markedly different set of circumstances from those present in
this case”).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 645 (“We do not, however, read Belton . . . as abandoning the Chimel justifications for the search incident to arrest exception.”). The court recognized that its narrow
interpretation of Belton was not the majority view. Id.
43. Id. at 648 (Bales, J., dissenting). The majority rejected the dissent’s contention that
its opinion overruled Belton, maintaining that the two cases were factually distinguishable.
Id. at 643 (majority opinion).
44. Id. at 646 (Bales, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 647. The dissent contended that “the core premise” of the Court’s decision
in Belton was to create a bright-line rule “that does not depend on case-by-case adjudication.” Id. at 649 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622–23 (2004)).
46. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714–16 (2009) (“The chorus that has called for
us to revisit Belton includes courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles. We therefore granted the State’s petition for certiorari.”).
47. Id. at 1723.
48. See infra Part II.A.1.
49. See infra Part II.A.1–2.
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field, although not before the Court again briefly reverted to an evidence-gathering rationale.50 This victory was later undermined, however, as the Court attempted to fashion the search incident to arrest
exception into a bright-line test while still purporting to maintain its
exigency-based rationale,51 causing a split among state and lower federal courts.52 By the time the Gant Court took up the issue, the exception was fraught with confusion, having led some Members of the
Court to call for a new framework to govern the search incident to
arrest exception.53
A. The Court Wavered Between Exigency and Evidence-Gathering
Rationales Before Settling on the Former in Chimel
The text of the Fourth Amendment has proven susceptible to two
different interpretations, as some Justices contend that it creates a
general warrant requirement while others argue that it prohibits only
unreasonable searches.54 The conflict between these two interpretations has significantly affected the development of the search incident
to arrest exception, as the Court has vacillated between an exigency
rationale, which requires exigent circumstances to justify deviation
from the general warrant requirement,55 and an evidence-gathering
rationale, which allows warrantless searches as a reasonable means of
discovering evidence and solving crimes.56 As the search incident to
50. See infra Part II.A.3.
51. See infra Part II.B.1.
52. See infra Part II.B.2.
53. See infra Part II.B.3.
54. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“When the Fourth Amendment outlawed ‘unreasonable searches’ . . . the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is ‘unreasonable’ unless a
warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.”), overruled by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), with id. at 60 (majority opinion) (“It is unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. It was recognized by the
framers of the Constitution that there were reasonable searches for which no warrant was
required.” (citation omitted)).
55. For example, in Trupiano v. United States, a case that applied the exigency rationale,
the Court focused on the general need for a search warrant, noting that the search incident to arrest exception requires the presence of “some other factor . . . that would make it
unreasonable or impracticable to require the arresting officer to equip himself with a
search warrant.” 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1998) (describing the search incident to arrest exception as a right that must be “strictly limited” to prevent it from “swallow[ing] the general
principle” that search warrants are required), overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950); see also infra Part II.A.2.
56. For instance, in United States v. Rabinowitz, a case applying an evidence-gathering
rationale, the Court emphasized that “searching for other proofs of guilt within the control
of the accused found upon arrest . . . was not ‘unreasonable.’” 339 U.S. at 61 (citation
omitted); see also infra Part II.A.3.
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arrest doctrine has developed from dictum into a substantial exception to the warrant requirement,57 the Court has wavered between the
two bases, struggling to root the exception firmly in either.58
1. The Court’s Prohibition Era Search and Seizure Cases Expanded
the Concept of the Search Incident to Arrest from Dictum into
a Significant Fourth Amendment Doctrine
Much of the Court’s Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence originates from Weeks v. United States,59 where the Court first
required that unconstitutionally obtained evidence be excluded from
trial.60 Weeks also contains the Court’s first mention of the search incident to arrest exception,61 as the Court noted that the right of law
enforcement to search the arrestee’s person to discover and seize evidence was “always recognized under English and American law.”62
The Court’s acknowledgement of this right, however, was unquestionably dictum: Weeks addressed the prosecution’s right to use materials
obtained in violation of the Constitution as evidence rather than the
search incident to arrest.63 In cases subsequent to Weeks, the Court
expanded both the scope and the precedential force of the search
incident to arrest exception.
The Court next took up the exception in Carroll v. United States,64
a case in which a Prohibition agent pulled over a known bootlegger
on the highway and, acting without a search warrant, found bottles of
whiskey located within the seats of the bootlegger’s automobile.65
The Court reasoned that a “necessary difference” exists between a
building search and a vehicle search and concluded that a search warrant was less imperative for the latter because of the risk that the vehicle could be removed from the jurisdiction before a warrant could be
57. See infra Part II.A.1.
58. Compare infra Part II.A.2, with infra Part II.A.3.
59. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
60. Id. at 398; see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (noting that
“virtually all of this Court’s search and seizure law has been developed since [Weeks]”).
Prior to Weeks, courts did not take notice of the way in which evidence material to a criminal trial was obtained. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 395–96 (citing numerous cases that had applied this earlier rule).
61. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969) (recognizing that the search
incident to arrest exception “seems first to have been articulated by the Court in 1914 as
dictum in Weeks”).
62. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392. The Court acknowledged the existence of this exception
while attempting “by a process of exclusion to state what [the Weeks case was] not.” Id.
63. Id. at 393; see also Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755 (describing the discussion of the search
incident to arrest exception in Weeks as “dictum”).
64. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
65. Id. at 134–37.
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obtained.66 The Carroll Court accordingly justified its holding based
upon the impracticability of obtaining search warrants for movable
vehicles, but noted that “[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is
reasonably practicable, it must be used.”67 The Court also issued an
expanded statement of the search incident to arrest exception in the
Carroll opinion, noting that searches of not only the arrestee’s person—as mentioned in Weeks68—but also of the area within the arrestee’s control were permissible.69 As in Weeks, however, the Carroll
Court’s reference to the search incident to arrest exception was
dictum.70
Two years later, the Court solidified the search incident to arrest
exception in Marron v. United States71 and upheld the search and
seizure of a ledger found in a closet by police during a defendant’s
arrest.72 Prior to Marron, the validity of the exception had been controversial and not universally accepted.73 Not only did Marron elevate
the exception from dictum to holding, it also expanded the exception’s scope to encompass “all parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose” grounding the arrest.74 Whereas Carroll had justified
the warrantless search based upon the exigency of the vehicle’s potential for being removed before a warrant could be obtained,75 the
66. Id. at 153. The Court in Carroll also noted that federal revenue laws dating back to
the first Congress in 1789 had consistently given agents greater authority to inspect and
seize contraband found in vehicles. Id. at 150–51.
67. Id. at 153, 156.
68. 232 U.S. at 392.
69. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158 (“[W]hatever is found upon his person or in his control . . .
may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.”).
70. Id. at 158 (“The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on
the right to arrest.”). For this reason, Carroll is best known for creating the “automobile
exception,” which permits warrantless vehicle searches when its criteria are satisfied. See
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (per curiam) (noting that the automobile
exception was first recognized in Carroll). The automobile exception allows a warrantless
search where “a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.” Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam) (citing California
v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985)). Apart from the inherent exigency of the automobile’s mobility, the automobile exception contains no additional exigency requirement. Id.
71. 275 U.S. 192 (1927). Marron did not involve a vehicle search. See id. at 198–99.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 195 (noting that lower courts differed in their views of searches like the one
in Marron, which “present[ed] one of the most frequent causes of appeals” at the time).
74. Id. at 199. The seized ledger was found in a closet, id. at 194, which would not be
construed as being within the arrestee’s “immediate control” under the framework established by subsequent cases. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (“There
is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that
in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers
or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.”).
75. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.

R
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Court in Marron focused on the police’s interest in gathering evidence, noting that the police “had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and seize the things
used to carry on the criminal enterprise.”76
2. The Court Later Retreated from Marron’s Broad, Evidence-Based
Conception of the Search Incident to Arrest, Justifying the
Exception with a More Restrictive Exigency Rationale
After broadly expanding the search incident to arrest exception
in the Prohibition era cases of Carroll and Marron, the Court generally
strengthened the warrant requirement,77 such as by requiring exigent
circumstances to justify warrantless searches incident to arrest. One of
the earliest cases78 to narrow the Court’s holding in Marron was GoBart Importing Co. v. United States.79 In Go-Bart, Prohibition agents compelled an arrestee “by threat of force”80 to open his safe and desk,
from which the agents, without a valid warrant,81 seized various items
following a search.82 The Court implied that it had embraced an exigency standard by noting that although the officers had the information and time necessary to obtain a warrant, they had failed to do so.83
A year later, the Court expanded on Go-Bart in United States v.
Lefkowitz,84 striking down the warrantless search of an arrestee’s office
subsequent to his arrest for participating in a conspiracy to sell liquor.85 In refusing to admit the unconstitutionally obtained evidence, the Lefkowitz Court emphasized that the searches were “made
solely to find evidence of [the arrestee’s] guilt of the alleged conspir76. Marron, 275 U.S. at 199.
77. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (remarking that after Weeks, “our jurisprudence lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness
alone. . . . By the late 1960’s, the preference for a warrant had won out, at least rhetorically” (citations omitted)).
78. James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to Arrest
Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1423 (noting that Go-Bart was the “first reversal of direction” from the broad searches allowed by
Marron).
79. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
80. Id. at 349.
81. Id. (noting that one of the agents “exhibited a paper which he falsely claimed was
such a warrant”).
82. Id. at 349–50 (describing the seized items).
83. Id. at 358 (“Notwithstanding [the fact that the officer] had an abundance of information and time to swear out a valid warrant, he failed to do so.”).
84. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
85. Id. at 458–60, 467 (concluding that “[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to
search for evidence”).
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acy or some other crime,” thus suggesting that an evidence-gathering
rationale was insufficient to uphold a search incident to arrest.86 In its
holding, the Court also strongly endorsed the necessity of a search
warrant wherever practical, declaring that “magistrates” are in a better
position to decide whether a particular search is reasonable than are
“hurried . . . officers . . . who may happen to make arrests.”87
The Court appeared to embrace an exigency rationale for warrantless searches incident to arrest in Trupiano v. United States,88 declaring unconstitutional the raid and warrantless search of a distillery
where the government had failed to obtain a search warrant despite
having adequate opportunity to do so.89 The Court noted that the
warrantless search incident to arrest is a “strictly limited right” that
“grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of
the arrest” and that it must be grounded in some exigency that makes
it “unreasonable or impracticable to require the arresting officer to
equip himself with a search warrant.”90 The mere fact that obtaining
a search warrant could be inconvenient to officers or cause a delay in
the execution of a search was insufficient to dispense with the warrant
requirement.91 Thus, while Go-Bart and Lefkowitz merely hinted at a
rejection of the evidence-gathering justification, Trupiano was the
Court’s first full-throated embrace of a strict exigency standard to justify warrantless searches incident to arrest.
3. The Court Briefly Returned to an Evidence-Gathering Rationale to
Justify the Search Incident to Arrest Exception Before
Seemingly Settling on the Exigency Rationale
While Trupiano seemed to firmly root the search incident to arrest exception in a strict exigency standard, it was not long before the
Court again used an evidence-gathering rationale to justify a more le86. Id. at 465. Additionally, the Court distinguished the case from Marron, noting that
the ledger seized in Marron was in plain view at the time of arrest and was part of the
equipment used to carry out an ongoing crime. Id. The Court further noted that no crime
was being committed in the officers’ presence at the time of the search in Lefkowitz. Id. at
462–63.
87. Id. at 464.
88. 334 U.S. 699 (1948), overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
89. Id. at 705–06. In Trupiano, an Internal Revenue agent infiltrated the distillery and
worked there undercover as a “mash man” for approximately three weeks before the raid,
using a portable two-way radio to relay information about the distillery’s operations to his
superiors. Id. at 701–02. On the basis of intelligence that the agent provided, a truckload
of alcohol had been seized after it left the distillery three days before the raid in question.
Id.
90. Id. at 708.
91. Id. at 706 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948)).
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nient application of the exception. In United States v. Rabinowitz,92 decided only two years after Trupiano, the Court again considered the
warrantless search of an office subsequent to arrest, this time reaching
a different conclusion than in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz.93 Asserting the
right of law enforcement to “search the place where the arrest is made
in order to find and seize things connected with the crime,”94 the
Court ruled that the government’s failure to obtain a search warrant
did not render the warrantless search unreasonable even though the
agents may have had time to obtain the warrant prior to undertaking
the search.95 Thus, while Trupiano focused on the need for exigent
circumstances to justify any deviation from the warrant requirement,96
Rabinowitz crafted a standard that showed greater deference to law
enforcement.97
Despite the instability that had previously typified the Court’s
warrantless search incident to arrest jurisprudence, Rabinowitz lasted
nineteen years before being overruled by Chimel v. California.98 In
Chimel, the Court reviewed an even more extensive warrantless search
than those at issue in Go-Bart, Lefkowitz, and Rabinowitz, as the police
searched the arrestee’s entire three bedroom house subsequent to his
arrest.99 Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, began his opinion with
a thorough historical review of the search incident to arrest exception,
noting that the scope of allowable searches incident to arrest had
waxed and waned in the years after it was first iterated in Weeks.100
The Court identified two exigencies that justify a warrantless
search incident to arrest: (1) the need to remove weapons in the arrestee’s possession, and (2) the need to prevent evidence from being
92. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
93. Id. at 62–64. Agents searched Rabinowitz’s office after another individual identified Rabinowitz as a dealer of forged stamps. Id. at 57.
94. Id. at 61 (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 65 (reasoning that “[i]t is fallacious to judge events retrospectively and thus
to determine, considering the time element alone, that there was time to procure a search
warrant”).
96. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
97. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 65 (“Some flexibility will be accorded law officers engaged in
daily battle with criminals for whose restraint criminal laws are essential.”).
98. 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (“[Rabinowitz is] no longer to be followed.”).
99. Id. at 754. In Chimel, officers obtained a warrant to arrest Chimel for burglarizing a
coin shop. Id. at 753. After arresting Chimel at his home, the officers, over Chimel’s objection, searched Chimel’s entire home, seizing a variety of coins, medals, and tokens. Id. at
753–54. The Court sidestepped Chimel’s assertion that the officers arranged for the arrest
to take place at his home solely to justify the search. Id. at 767 & n.13.
100. Id. at 755–61.
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concealed or destroyed.101 Having identified these exigencies, the
Court held that they could justify a search of both the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control.”102 In so holding,
however, the Court required that the scope of a warrantless search
incident to arrest be limited specifically by the existence of the twin
exigencies justifying the search in the first instance.103 Accordingly,
the Court found the search of Chimel’s entire home unconstitutional
because the police searched far beyond the area from which Chimel
could have obtained a weapon or an item of evidence.104 Noting further that any decision on the legality of a warrantless search mandated
a careful balancing of the defendant’s interest in his own privacy and
the police’s interest in enforcing the law, the Court ultimately concluded that the warrant requirement could not be excused “without a
showing . . . that the exigencies of the situation made [a warrantless
search] imperative.”105 Chimel re-established the proposition set forth
in Trupiano that the search incident to arrest exception is a “strictly
limited right” justified only by exigent circumstances.106
B. The Court Applied the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine to the
Vehicular Context, Leading to Confusion Among State and
Lower Federal Courts and Calls for a New Framework
The search incident to arrest exception, hardly a model of clarity,
became even more muddled when the Court attempted to determine
its scope in the context of the “recurring factual situation” of the arrest of a vehicle’s occupant or recent occupant.107 While the Court
attempted to fashion a “straightforward rule”108 to govern vehicular
searches, the result created a split among the state and lower federal
courts.109 The wide range of criticism generated by the Court’s application of the search incident to arrest exception to the vehicular con101. Id. at 762–63.
102. Id. at 763 (defining a defendant’s area of immediate control as “the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence”).
103. Id. at 762–63 (explaining that “[t]he scope of [a] search must be ‘strictly tied to
and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible” (alterations
in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
104. Id. at 768.
105. Id. at 761 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 759 (quoting Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
107. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
108. Id. at 459–60.
109. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
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text boiled to the surface in the 2004 decision Thornton v. United States,
in which two Justices called for a new framework and a majority of
Justices expressed dissatisfaction with the status quo.110
1. The Supreme Court Applied Chimel’s Area of Immediate Control
Rule to Situations in Which the Arrestee Is a Recent
Occupant of an Automobile
In the often-maligned111 case of New York v. Belton, the Court
sought to provide a workable definition of the permissible scope of a
search incident to arrest where the arrestee is an occupant of a vehicle, and the arrestee’s area of immediate control includes the vehicle’s
interior.112 Belton arose out of an uncommon situation113 in which a
lone police officer pulled over a vehicle containing four men and,
upon smelling the odor of marijuana, ordered the men out of the car
and placed them under arrest.114 As the officer possessed only a single pair of handcuffs, he could not restrain the men115 and accordingly ordered each suspect to a different section of the highway in
order to separate them while he searched the car.116 Inside the passenger compartment, the officer found a bag of cocaine in one of
Belton’s jacket pockets.117
Faced with this set of facts, the Belton Court read Chimel in light of
the “generalization” that articles inside the passenger compartment of
110. See infra Part II.B.3.
111. See, e.g., State v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565, 579–80 (Wis. 1986) (Bablitch, J., dissenting)
(“I do not find one commentary favorable to the Belton rule, and there are many which are
not.”), overruled by State v. Dearborn, 786 N.W.2d 97 (Wis. 2010).
112. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
113. See infra note 116 (explaining that police departments generally advise officers not
to conduct vehicle searches until the vehicle’s occupants have been secured).
114. Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56.
115. Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (No. 80-328), 1980 WL 339862, at
*3.
116. Belton, 453 U.S. at 456. The Belton opinion sheds no light on why the arresting
officer failed to postpone his search until support arrived, instead conducting it while the
four suspects stood unrestrained on the highway. A 2002 study soliciting guidelines for
search incident to arrest procedures from police departments across the State of California
found that not a single department’s procedures endorsed this approach. Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 WIS.
L. REV. 657, 664, 675–76. One of the responding departments explained that a vehicle
search requires an officer to place his body into awkward positions that limit the officer’s
defensive range of motion, divert the officer’s attention from the suspect(s), and often
expose the officer’s firearm. Id. at 675. Accordingly, police search procedures generally
call for officers to refrain from searching a vehicle until all of its occupants have been
secured and, in the case of multiple suspects, to wait for reinforcements to arrive before
beginning the search. Id. at 675–76.
117. Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.
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an automobile are “generally, even if not inevitably,” within the arrestee’s area of immediate control.118 Based on this “generalization,” the
Court held that police may search the passenger compartment of an
automobile as a contemporaneous incident of the lawful arrest of the
automobile’s occupant.119 The Court further held that police could
search any containers located within the passenger compartment,
whether open or closed.120 Finally, the Court approvingly cited, without explicitly incorporating into its holding, language from United
States v. Robinson,121 decided in the interim between Chimel and Belton,
that indicated that the authority to search containers exists regardless
of the probability that evidentiary or safety concerns exist in a particular case.122 The Court noted, however, that its holding did not alter
the fundamental principles established in Chimel that concerned the
basic scope of a search incident to arrest.123
2. Courts at the State and Federal Levels Have Not Applied Belton’s
Rule Uniformly
While the Belton Court sought to create a “single familiar standard”124 to govern the search of an automobile incident to arrest,
state and lower federal courts often struggled to apply its rule.125 In
addition to the problem of factual ambiguity regarding when the Bel118. Id. at 460.
119. Id. Belton’s holding expressly does not apply to the trunk of a vehicle. Id. at 460
n.4.
120. Id. at 460–61. The Court defined a container as “any object capable of holding
another object,” including “closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles . . . as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.” Id. at 460 n.4.
121. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
122. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 (“The authority to search the person incident to a lawful
custodial arrest . . . does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability
in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found . . . .”
(quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Belton
Court’s inclusion of this language is curious because Robinson only considered the search
of the arrestee’s person, which the Robinson Court described as a “distinct proposition[ ]”
that had been “treated quite differently” from the search of an arrestee’s area of control.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224.
123. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3 (“Our holding today does no more than determine the
meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic context. It in no way
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope
of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.”).
124. Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. See, e.g., United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 1999) (Trott, J.,
concurring) (recognizing the lack of clarity provided by Belton and the confusion that it
had engendered).
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ton rule applies,126 state and lower federal courts have adopted opposing interpretations on whether one of the Chimel rationales must be
present to authorize a search.127 This confusion seems to have arisen
from the Belton Court’s approval of the holding in Robinson that the
presence of a Chimel exigency is not required in every case where the
arrestee’s person is searched incident to arrest.128 The fact that Belton
did not explicitly extend Robinson to searches of the arrestee’s area of
control in its holding,129 combined with the statement that Belton did
not alter the fundamental principles of Chimel,130 has led to confusion

126. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing issues likely to raise such
factual ambiguity). Justice Brennan noted that the Belton decision did not, for instance,
resolve (1) how long after the arrest a Belton search may be conducted, (2) how close the
arrestee must be to the vehicle to justify a search, (3) whether probable cause must exist
before the arrestee is removed from the car or may be formed afterward, and (4) how the
passenger compartment is defined for vehicles such as taxicabs or hatchbacks. Id.; see also,
e.g., McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 890 (upholding a search that began five minutes after the
police had removed the arrestee from the scene); United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631,
633–34, 636 (10th Cir. 1992) (striking down a search that began after the arrestee had left
the scene).
127. At the state level, compare State v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565, 572 (Wis. 1986) (finding
that Chimel’s “justifications . . . exist regardless of the officer’s subjective intent” and that
“[t]he validity of a search incident to arrest is determined by the legality of the arrest and
whether the search was limited to an area from which the defendant might gain possession
of a weapon or evidentiary items”), overruled by State v. Dearborn, 786 N.W.2d 97 (Wis.
2010), with Ferrell v. State, 649 So. 2d 831, 833 (Miss. 1995) (striking down a search that
“cannot be classified as incident to arrest” because the arresting officer could not have had
a reasonable concern about his safety or the possible destruction of evidence). Some states
have even refused to apply Belton, either holding that it conflicts with privacy protections
guaranteed by their state constitutions or ignoring the case completely. See Moskovitz,
supra note 116, at 696 n.175 (listing cases). At the federal level, compare United States v.
Hrasky, 453 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that Belton did not require a case-bycase adjudication of the presence of the Chimel rationales (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 459)),
and McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 891–92 (same), with United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 379
(5th Cir. 2003) (finding that the search of an arrestee’s vehicle was not justified where
neither Chimel rationale was present).
128. See, e.g., Fry, 388 N.W.2d at 572 (explaining that while “Robinson involved searches
of the person[ ] . . . Belton applied [Robinson’s] reasoning to searches beyond the person of
the defendant” (citation omitted)); Hrasky, 453 F.3d at 1101 (concluding, based upon the
Robinson language quoted in Belton, that “Belton similarly rejected the contention that
‘there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of
the reasons’ supporting a search incident to arrest” (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 459) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
129. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (“[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident
of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” (footnote omitted)).
The Belton Court did, however, reference Robinson when discussing law enforcement’s ability to search containers that could not hold a weapon or evidence of the crime of arrest.
Id. at 461.
130. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR305.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 16

10-MAY-11

ARIZONA V. GANT

13:53

841

as to whether the Chimel rationales must exist to justify a Belton
search.131
The Court’s post-Belton cases also did not provide guidance as to
which interpretation of Belton should be followed when a lawful arrest
has occurred. In Knowles v. Iowa,132 for example, the Court declined
to extend the Belton rule to the search of a vehicle whose occupant
received a traffic citation instead of being arrested.133 In so doing, the
Court noted the absence of the Chimel justifications in this circumstance,134 but the Court explicitly limited its holding to the constitutionality of a “search incident to citation” where those rationales were
absent.135
3. Members of the Court Criticized Belton and Called for a New
Search Incident to Arrest Framework in Thornton
In United States v. Thornton, the Court held that Belton applies to
situations where the police do not initiate contact until after the arrestee has left the vehicle.136 In that case, the defendant had parked and
exited his vehicle before police were able to initiate contact with
him.137 After a consensual pat down, which revealed drugs concealed
on the defendant’s person, the officer arrested the defendant and
then proceeded to search the defendant’s vehicle, where he found a
handgun.138 The Court noted that the arrest of a suspect located next
to a vehicle presented concerns regarding officer safety and evidence
preservation that were identical to those presented by the arrest of a
suspect inside the vehicle, and the Court explained that no logical
reason existed for applying different standards to the two scenarios.139
131. See Leslie A. Lunney, The (Inevitably Arbitrary) Placement of Bright Lines: Belton and Its
Progeny, 79 TUL. L. REV. 365, 380–81 (2004) (attributing Belton’s failure to “fully resolve the
ongoing dispute over warrantless searches incident to arrest” in the automotive context to
the “underlying tension” between the Belton Court’s endorsement of Robinson’s reasoning
and proclaimed fidelity to Chimel’s fundamental principles).
132. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
133. Id. at 118–19 (declining to extend Robinson’s “‘bright-line rule’ to a situation where
the concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent and the concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all”).
134. See id. at 117–19 (explaining why the Chimel rationales generally would not justify a
“‘search incident to citation’”).
135. Id. at 117 (“But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to
arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.”).
136. 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
137. Id. at 618.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 621 (“It would make little sense to apply two different rules to what is, at
bottom, the same situation.”).
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Thornton is also significant because a majority of the Justices used
the case to criticize Belton.140 Justice Scalia, while concurring in the
Court’s judgment, called for a new search incident to arrest framework to replace Belton’s bright-line rule.141 Contending that “Belton
cannot reasonably be explained as a mere application of Chimel,”142
Justice Scalia sought to return the search incident to arrest exception
in the vehicular context to a framework based on “the more general
interest in gathering evidence.”143 While acknowledging that Chimel is
a “plausible account[ ] of what the Constitution requires,”144 Justice
Scalia proposed that Belton searches should be allowed only in “cases
where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”145 The tension between the exigency and evidentiary bases for the search incident to arrest
exception, seemingly extinguished by Chimel, was thus reignited with
Justice Scalia’s separate opinion in Thornton.146

140. In addition to Justice Scalia’s critical attack, which was joined by Justice Ginsburg,
id. at 625–29 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]n our search for clarity, we have
now abandoned our constitutional moorings and floated to a place where the law approves
of purely exploratory searches of vehicles . . . .” (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 170
F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1999) (Trott, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)),
Justice O’Connor criticized Belton’s rule as a “police entitlement” based on a “shaky foundation,” id. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). Justices Stevens and Souter criticized the Court for extending Belton’s bright-line rule without providing sufficient
guidance as to how the extension should be applied and reiterated a concern regarding
Belton’s authorization of passenger compartment container searches. Id. at 634–36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If Belton searches are justifiable, it is not because the arrestee might grab a weapon or evidentiary item from his car, but
simply because the car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which he was
arrested.”).
142. Id. at 631. Justice Scalia noted that the Government’s brief in Thornton failed to cite
a single instance where a handcuffed arrestee managed to retrieve a weapon or piece of
evidence from his vehicle. Id. at 626–27 (discussing the cases cited by the United States
where a handcuffed arrestee used a weapon to attack a police officer).
143. Id. at 629. To support this proposition, Justice Scalia cited principally to Rabinowitz.
Id. For additional discussion of Rabinowitz, see supra text accompanying notes 92–97.
144. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631. Justice Scalia essentially equated the legitimacy of Rabinowitz with that of Chimel, noting that “neither [case] is so persuasive as to justify departing
from settled law.” Id.
145. Id. at 632.
146. Cf. Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1448 (“Consequently, if the ‘evidence-gathering’
rationale of Rabinowitz is to supplant the ‘concealment or destruction’ rationale of Chimel
as an explanation for the searches that are currently authorized by Belton, those searches
would remain constitutional only in ‘cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”).
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Arizona v. Gant,147 the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona and held that
Chimel restricts the warrantless search of an automobile incident to an
occupant’s arrest to situations where “the arrestee is unsecured and
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search.”148 The Court also concluded, “Although it does not follow from Chimel,” the search of a vehicle incident to arrest is justified
where police have reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence of
the crime of arrest.149 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens examined Chimel and Belton and noted that the Court’s holding in Belton
had been “widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the
arrest of a recent occupant,” even where there is no possibility of the
arrestee accessing the automobile during the search.150 Justice Stevens attributed this understanding to Justice Brennan’s strong dissent
in Belton.151 Rejecting this broad reading, Justice Stevens explained
that it was “incompatible” with the statement in Belton that the fundamental principles of Chimel remained intact.152
In adopting a narrow interpretation of Belton, the Court found
that the State of Arizona had underestimated the privacy interests at
stake in the search incident to arrest exception153 while overestimating the clarity and necessity to police supposedly offered by the
broader interpretation.154 While acknowledging that a person’s privacy interest in a vehicle is less than a person’s privacy interest in a
home, the Court found that a broad blanket authorization to search
not only the passenger compartment but also any containers located
therein implicated concerns about “unbridled [police] discretion”
and posed “a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless
individuals.”155 The Court then suggested that the Belton rule was a
147. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
148. Id. at 1719, 1724.
149. Id. (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
150. Id. at 1716–18.
151. Id. at 1718; see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 468 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (predicting that Belton would allow searches of inaccessible areas of the vehicle and
would allow searches even if the arrestees were handcuffed and secured in the backseat of
a police car).
152. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (reasoning that “[t]o read Belton as authorizing a vehicle
search incident to every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the
justifications underlying the Chimel exception”); see also supra note 123 and accompanying
text.
153. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720.
154. Id. at 1720–21.
155. Id. at 1720.
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“bright line” in name only,156 explaining that state and lower federal
courts had reached differing standards in determining the factual
predicates for its application.157 Furthermore, the Court noted that
the police may continue to invoke other exceptions to the warrant
requirement in the vehicular context, making the broad interpretation of Belton “unnecessary to protect law enforcement . . . interests.”158 The Court reasoned that while its decision limited the ability
of officers to conduct warrantless searches, a broad construction of
Belton would treat the right to search as a “police entitlement,” which
cannot justify an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.159
The majority then advanced several arguments in opposition to
the dissenting opinion’s contention that stare decisis compelled adherence to the broad interpretation of Belton.160 The majority first
explained that while stare decisis is essential to the stability of the law,
it does not require the Court to affirm an unconstitutional practice,
especially “in a case that is so easily distinguished from the decisions
that arguably compel it.”161 The Court also downplayed the suggestion that law enforcement reliance necessitated the application of
stare decisis to the broad interpretation of Belton, maintaining that
police reliance fell short of the “broader societal reliance” required to

156. See id. at 1721 (“The rule has thus generated a great deal of uncertainty, particularly for a rule touted as providing a ‘bright line.’”).
157. Id. at 1720–21 & nn.6–7. Specifically, the Court pointed out that lower courts had
split on where and when law enforcement’s initial contact with the arrestee must take place
to bring the Belton rule into effect, as well as on the reasonableness of a search executed
after the arrestee is removed from the scene. Id. at 1720 n.6 (listing cases in which courts
applied differing standards regarding when and where police must first make contact with
the arrestee for Belton to apply); id. at 1721 n.7 (citing cases showing a lack of consistency
among state and lower federal courts as to the legitimacy of a permissible Belton search
after the arrestee had been removed from the scene).
158. Id. at 1721. For instance, the Court explained that warrantless searches are generally permitted (1) where the officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual is dangerous, (2) where there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal
activity, and (3) where an officer reasonably suspects a dangerous individual may be hiding. Id.
159. Id. Justice O’Connor first asserted that Belton treated the ability to search a vehicle
incident to arrest as a “police entitlement” in her partial concurring opinion in Thornton.
See supra note 140.
160. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1722–23.
161. Id. at 1722. The Court asserted that Gant was easily distinguishable from Belton in
that Gant was a lone arrestee securely detained by multiple officers, whereas in Belton “one
officer [was] confronted by four unsecured arrestees.” Id. The Court also distinguished
Gant from Thornton because the police arrested Gant for a traffic, rather than a drug, offense. Id.
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invoke stare decisis.162 Finally, the Court asserted that Belton was
based on a “faulty assumption” that “authorize[d] myriad unconstitutional searches,” which obviated the argument that stare decisis requires upholding the broad interpretation of Belton.163
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he criticized
the majority’s interpretation of Belton as an “artificial narrowing”164
and called for Chimel to be “entirely abandoned” in the context of
vehicular searches and for Belton and Thornton to be overruled.165 In
place of the Chimel-Belton-Thornton framework, Justice Scalia proposed
allowing police to search an automobile incident to arrest only where
it is reasonable to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the
crime of arrest or of other crimes that the officer has probable cause
to believe occurred.166 Despite his disagreement with Justice Stevens’s
interpretation of Belton, Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion because of a desire to avoid a “4-to-1-to-4 opinion that [would] leave[ ]
the governing rule uncertain.”167 He reasoned that “plainly unconstitutional searches” permitted by the broad interpretation of Belton
were a “greater evil” than the lack of certainty resulting from the narrow interpretation.168
In dissent, Justice Alito defended the (broad) bright-line interpretation of Belton and criticized the majority’s two-part test.169 Justice
162. Id. at 1722–23. The Court found that the police’s reliance interest was outweighed
by “the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional
rights fully protected.” Id. at 1723.
163. Id. (“We now know that articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely
‘within the area into which an arrestee might reach . . . .’” (quoting New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. Id. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia explained that he understood
Belton and Thornton to always allow a search incident to arrest, regardless of the presence of
Chimel rationales. Id. at 1724. Justice Scalia called for the Court to overturn Belton on the
ground that it was “badly reasoned” and produced unconstitutional results. Id. at 1725.
165. Id. at 1725.
166. Id. The majority opinion adopted this proposal with regard to evidence of the
crime of the arrest as a second justification for a warrantless search incident to arrest. See
supra text accompanying note 149. The majority’s adoption of this proposal, however,
does not mention searches for other crimes that an officer has probable cause to believe
occurred. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (“[W]e also conclude that circumstances unique to the
vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” (quoting United
States v. Thornton, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment))).
167. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1726–27 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent in
which he conceded that Belton’s bright-line rule could “produce results divorced from its
underlying Fourth Amendment rationale,” but nonetheless argued that the majority had
not met the “heavy burden” required to overcome stare decisis and overturn precedent.
Id. at 1725–26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Alito contended that by abandoning the clear bright-line test, the majority had “substantially overruled” both Belton and Thornton without
justifying its “departure from the usual rule of stare decisis.”170 The
dissent examined several justifications for overruling precedent,171 ultimately concluding that considerable police reliance,172 the absence
of changed circumstances or subsequent decisions undermining Belton,173 and the quality of Belton’s reasoning174 required continued adherence to the broad interpretation. Justice Alito also criticized the
second part of the Court’s rule, which adopted Justice Scalia’s evidence standard, as having been adopted “uncritically from Justice
Scalia’s separate opinion in Thornton,” and he argued that it “raise[d]
doctrinal and practical problems.”175
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Arizona v. Gant, the Court limited Belton searches to situations
where the arrestee is unsecured and in reaching distance of the vehicle’s passenger compartment when the search occurs, or where there
is reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of
arrest.176 The jurisprudence concerning the search incident to arrest
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement has been
unstable and adhered little to the rule of stare decisis.177 In Gant, the
170. Id. at 1727–28 (Alito, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that Belton had explicitly
endorsed a bright-line approach to vehicular searches incident to arrest, and that Justice
Brennan’s dissent in Belton was not a mischaracterization of Belton’s holding. Id. at 1727.
171. Id. at 1728. Justice Alito listed several relevant factors to be considered in overruling a constitutional precedent, including: (1) reliance on the precedent, (2) important
changes in circumstances since the decision was rendered, (3) the precedent’s workability,
(4) the extent to which the precedent was undermined by later decisions, and (5) the
quality of the precedent’s reasoning. Id.
172. Id. The dissent disputed the majority’s distinction between reliance by law enforcement and reliance by society generally, arguing that the case supporting the majority’s
position did not actually refer to societal reliance, but rather found reliance based upon
law enforcement training and conduct. Id. at 1728–29; see also supra text accompanying
note 162.
173. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1729 (Alito, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1729–31 (calling Belton a “modest—and quite defensible—extension of
Chimel”). Justice Breyer did not join the section of Justice Alito’s dissent that defended
Belton’s reasoning. Id. at 1726.
175. Id. at 1731. Justice Alito noted a discrepancy between this “reasonable to believe”
standard and the Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause” standard. Id. He also questioned
why this standard restricted searches to the crime of arrest rather than allowing them
whenever police have reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence of other criminal
activity. Id.
176. Id. at 1719 (majority opinion).
177. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969) (“The decisions of this Court
bearing upon [this] question have been far from consistent, as even the most cursory review makes evident.”).
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Court rightly invalidated the broad interpretation of Belton, as that decision was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with precedent.178 Unfortunately, the Gant decision will not be a lasting precedent because its
two justifications for warrantless searches in the vehicular context are
internally inconsistent.179 The Gant Court erred by appending Justice
Scalia’s evidence standard to Chimel’s exigency-based approach, as the
evidence standard resembles a bright-line rule and disregards the
Fourth Amendment’s historical foundation.180 Furthermore, the evidence standard, by virtue of its thin doctrinal basis, is unacceptably
vague and will present numerous problems for those who will apply it
in practice.181 Instead of merely vanquishing Belton’s bright-line rule
while adopting Justice Scalia’s more limited bright-line, the Court
should have issued a full-throated restoration of Chimel’s exigencybased standard, even if it may have only been able to do so in the form
of a plurality opinion.182
A. The Court in Gant Rightly Limited Belton’s Applicability to the
Spatial Scope of Warrantless Searches Incident to Arrest Where
the Arrestee Is Unsecured
This Note will not address at length the largely semantic question
of whether Gant overruled Belton or merely adopted a more limited
interpretation of its holding. What is relevant here is that Gant erased
the portion of Belton that could be interpreted to permit warrantless
searches incident to arrest in every instance where the recent occupant of an automobile is arrested, while maintaining the portion of
the opinion that defined the spatial scope of the recent occupant’s
area of control when the arrestee is unsecured and able to reach the
vehicle’s passenger compartment.183 Even accepting, arguendo, Justice Alito’s conclusion that the majority in Gant “substantially overruled Belton,”184 the Court should not be faulted for overturning a
178. See infra Part IV.A.
179. See infra Part IV.B.1.
180. See infra Part IV.B.2.
181. See infra Part IV.B.3.
182. See infra Part IV.C.
183. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (“Accordingly, we reject this
[broad] reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a
vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”).
184. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. Although it is clear that the majority in
Gant significantly reduced Belton’s significance, whether Gant actually overruled Belton is
disputable. The majority did not, for instance, alter Belton’s core generalization that the
entire passenger compartment, and any containers therein, may be searched regardless of
whether a given item was actually within the arrestee’s reach as long as the arrestee was

R

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR305.txt

848

unknown

Seq: 23

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

10-MAY-11

13:53

[VOL. 70:826

case that is based on a judicial fiction and patently at odds with the
precedent cited to support it.185
The Belton decision has received a considerable amount of criticism in the years since it was issued.186 One of the case’s main failings
is that it attempted to distill a general rule from a situation in which
generally accepted police procedures relating to the search of a vehicle had not been followed.187 In this uncommon situation,188 in
which a police officer searched a vehicle while multiple suspects remained unsecured on the highway, the Court read Chimel in light of
the “generalization” that articles inside the passenger compartment of
an automobile are within the arrestee’s area of control.189 Armed
with this “generalization”—actually a judicial fiction given that it is
common practice for police officers to restrain arrestees before
searching their vehicles190—the Court authorized searches of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers located therein.191 The Belton
Court hinted that it was expanding the Robinson rule, which dispensed
with the requirement of a Chimel exigency in searches of an arrestee’s
person and containers found thereon, to searches of an arrestee’s
unsecured and in reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718–19.
185. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 465–66 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling the notion “that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an
arrestee who has recently been in the car” a “fiction” and arguing that the Court’s holding
“ignores both precedent and principle”).
186. See, e.g., id; see also supra note 111.
187. See Moskovitz, supra note 116, at 674–75 (discussing the Belton Court’s rationale for
the bright-line standard and noting that “[t]he Court might have been better served by
finding some means of determining what really happens when the police arrest the driver
of an automobile”); see also supra note 116 (discussing typical police procedures for the
search of a vehicle).
188. See supra note 116.
189. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
190. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“[T]he practice of restraining an arrestee on the scene before searching a
car that he just occupied is so prevalent that holding that Belton does not apply in that
setting would . . . largely render Belton a dead letter.” (alteration in original) (quoting Brief
for the United States at 36–37, Thornton, 541 U.S. 615 (No. 03-5165), 2004 WL 121585, at
36–37) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Justice Scalia noted that the cases cited in
the Government’s brief in Thornton contained not a single instance where a restrained
arrestee had managed to retrieve a weapon or evidence from his vehicle. See supra note
142. Even Justice Alito, who defended Belton in Gant, conceded in Gant that Belton’s generalization is rarely true. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1729 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[S]urely it was well known in 1981 that a person who is taken from a vehicle,
handcuffed, and placed in the back of a patrol car is unlikely to make it back into his own
car to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence.”).
191. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460–61.
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area of control.192 While this hint was not part of the Court’s explicit
holding, most courts have understood Belton to require no actual
showing of exigency to authorize the search of a vehicle.193
As a result, Belton arguably untethered the justification for vehicular searches incident to arrest from the Chimel exigency standard,
thereby untethering its reasoning from Chimel despite the Court’s
statement that Belton did not alter Chimel’s fundamental principles.194
Searches of an arrestee’s person and area of control have “historically
been formulated into two distinct propositions,”195 and while the exigency requirement reasonably can be removed from the former due
to inherent officer safety concerns,196 removing the exigency requirement from the latter leads to “erroneous” and “unconstitutional” results.197 Whereas Chimel’s exception to the warrant requirement was
justified by officer safety and evidence preservation, Belton’s holding is
based predominantly on an interest in certainty.198 There certainly is
192. See id. at 461 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), for the proposition that such searches are permitted despite the fact that containers found on an arrestee’s person “will sometimes be such that they could hold neither a weapon nor evidence
of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested”).
193. See, e.g., State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 645 (Ariz. 2007), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)
(noting that the bright-line interpretation of Belton was the majority view).
194. Belton, 453 U.S. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“By approving the constitutionality
of the warrantless search in this case, the Court carves out a dangerous precedent that is
not justified by the concerns underlying Chimel. Disregarding the principle ‘that the scope
of a warrantless search must be commensurate with the rationale that excepts the search
from the warrant requirement,’ the Court for the first time grants police officers authority
to conduct a warrantless ‘area’ search under circumstances where there is no chance that
the arrestee ‘might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 460 n.3 (majority opinion) (noting that Belton did not “alter[ ] the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident
to lawful custodial arrests”).
195. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224.
196. An arrest necessarily subjects law enforcement to “extended exposure” with the
arrestee, whom officers take into custody and transport to a police station. Id. at 234–35.
An arrestee carrying a small weapon on his person, even if handcuffed, could possibly
retrieve that weapon and use it to attack an officer at any point during the arrest process.
Moskovitz, supra note 116, at 672. Once the arrestee is removed from the scene of arrest,
however, he will obviously be unable to retrieve any items from that scene. See Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 626 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (critiquing the
assertion that an arrestee may be able to escape and retrieve a weapon or evidence following his arrest and placement in a patrol car).
197. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1725 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); United States
v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 894–95 (9th Cir. 1999) (Trott, J., concurring) (discussing
constitutional flaws in Belton’s bright-line interpretation).
198. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (“In short, ‘[a] single familiar standard is essential to
guide police officers . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979))); see also Thornton, 541 U.S. at 634 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “Belton’s basic rationale . . . rested not on a concern for officer safety, but rather on
an overriding desire to hew ‘to a straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably en-
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an interest in having a clear rule.199 That interest, however, does not
justify a standard that functions as a “police entitlement,”200 allowing
warrantless searches every time police effectuate an arrest on the
highway.201
Therefore, the Gant Court’s rejection of Belton’s bright-line interpretation wisely pruned an exception to the warrant requirement that
had, in the context of vehicular searches, sprawled beyond its original
constitutional justifications.202 The Court essentially reduced Belton to
a spatial description of those sections of the vehicle that are within the
area of an occupant’s control when the occupant is unsecured and
able to reach the passenger compartment at the time of the search.203
In undoing the Belton Court’s misguided extension of the bright-line
principle204 to searches of an arrestee’s area of control,205 Gant ensures that Belton will honor its pledge to do “no more than determine

forced’” (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 459)); Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1435–36 (considering and rejecting other potential motivations for Belton’s holding).
199. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459–60 (“When a person cannot know how a court will apply
a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of
his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority.”). Unfortunately, this justification ignores the Court’s longstanding recognition that Fourth
Amendment reasonableness turns not on “a neat set of legal rules” but on “the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996) (quoting Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. See supra note 140.
201. Cf. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 634 (reasoning that “the interest in certainty that supports
Belton’s bright-line rule surely does not justify an expansion of the rule” to searches incident to traffic citations).
202. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“By approving the constitutionality of the warrantless search in this case, the Court carves out a dangerous precedent that
is not justified by the concerns underlying Chimel.”); see also McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 894
(Trott, J., concurring) (bemoaning that “in our search for clarity, we have now abandoned
our constitutional moorings and floated to a place where the law approves of purely exploratory searches of vehicles”).
203. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 (2009) (“That is, when the passenger compartment is within an arrestee’s reaching distance, Belton supplies the generalization that
the entire compartment and any containers therein may be reached.”); see also Michael
Goodin, Arizona v. Gant: The Supreme Court Gets It Right (Almost), 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
115, 142 (2010) (noting that Gant’s narrow reading of Belton “does provide an answer to
the difficult question of how much of the interior of an [sic] automobile officers should be
able to search incident to arrest”).
204. Chief Justice Rehnquist has colorfully denounced the false comfort of bright-line
standards, noting that “any search for ‘bright lines’ . . . is apt to be illusory. Our entire
profession is trained to attack ‘bright lines’ the way hounds attack foxes.” Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 197–203.
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the meaning of Chimel’s principles in [a] particular and problematic
context.”206
B. The Gant Court Erred by Embracing a Rule That Combined the
Exigency and Evidence-Gathering Rationales Because the Rule
Creates Doctrinal Inconsistency and Ambiguity
Although Gant rightly limited Belton’s applicability to situations in
which the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
vehicle’s passenger compartment, it nevertheless, through inclusion
of Justice Scalia’s evidence standard, failed to alleviate the inconsistency that has plagued the search incident to arrest exception for decades.207 The combination of Chimel’s exigency-based standard and
Justice Scalia’s evidence standard is internally inconsistent, mixing
Chimel’s doctrine with that of prior cases that Chimel expressly overruled.208 The evidence standard is also inconsistent with the historical
principles existing at the time of the founding,209 and its thin doctrinal support will cause continued ambiguity within search incident to
arrest jurisprudence.210 To avoid these inconsistencies and ambiguities, the Gant Court should have posited a rule based solely on Chimel’s
exigency rationale, even though doing so may have resulted in a rule
that garnered support from only a plurality of the Justices.211
1. Justice Scalia’s Evidence Standard, Which May Resemble a BrightLine Rule, Undermines the Principles of Chimel
By grafting Justice Scalia’s evidence standard onto the exigencybased rationale of Chimel, the Court in Gant, like the Court in Belton,
undermined Chimel’s carefully analyzed policy justifications for the
search incident to arrest exception.212 The Court in Chimel conducted
206. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3; cf. Goodin, supra note 203, at 141–42 (concluding that
“[t]he Court’s decision in Gant laid out the proper framework for interpreting Belton” because the facts of Belton demonstrate that the Chimel rationales were present in that case
and that the opinion “should have [had only] limited applicability”).
207. See infra Part IV.B.1; see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969) (calling
the Court’s decisions regarding the search incident to arrest exception “far from
consistent”).
208. See infra Part IV.B.1.
209. See infra Part IV.B.2.
210. See infra Part IV.B.3.
211. See infra Part IV.C.
212. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for “turn[ing] its back on the product of” Chimel’s careful analysis of “more
than 50 years of conflicting precedent governing the permissible scope of warrantless
searches incident to custodial arrest” by “formulating an arbitrary ‘bright-line’ rule applicable to ‘recent’ occupants of automobiles that fails to reflect Chimel’s underlying policy justifications”); Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1472 (observing that the evidence standard
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a thorough exploration of the historical background of the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement and the search incident to arrest
exception, examining the Amendment’s colonial origins and the turmoil characterizing the exception subsequent to its first iteration in
Weeks.213 The Court ultimately crafted a standard that carefully balanced individuals’ rights to privacy and legitimate law enforcement
interests.214 Chimel thus comes down firmly on the side of a general
warrant requirement, describing the need for search warrants as a
“constitutional requirement” that “serves a high function.”215 While
Justice Scalia may dismiss “the preference for a warrant” as merely rhetorical or illusory,216 Chimel is clear in requiring “a showing by those
who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate [of a search
warrant] that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.”217 The decision then defines the two exigencies that allow the
search of an arrestee’s person and area of control under certain circumstances.218 Overall, Chimel is pragmatic in recognizing that excep-

adopted in Gant could “mark a return to the regime that produced a result found unacceptable by the entire Warren Court in Chimel.”).
The development of the search incident to arrest doctrine makes clear that the Court
not only oscillated between the exigency and evidence-gathering rationales during the doctrine’s early development, see supra Part II.A, but also that these rationales are highly inconsistent with one another, see, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960)
(conceding that the Court’s search incident to arrest cases “cannot be satisfactorily reconciled” due to “strong and fluctuating differences of view on the Court”). This inconsistency is illustrated by the frequency with which the Court overruled its precedents as it
shifted the search incident to arrest between the two rationales. Compare United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (overruling Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948)),
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), with Chimel, 395 U.S. 752 (overruling
Rabinowitz).
213. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755–62.
214. See Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1429 (explaining that Chimel’s “dual goals were to
ensure that officers had the authority they need and deserve, while also preserving privacy
interests those officers had no reason to invade”).
215. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56
(1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Compare id., with Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 60
(“It is unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. It was recognized by the framers of the Constitution that there were reasonable searches for which no
warrant was required.” (citation omitted)).
216. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“By the late 1960’s, the preference for a warrant had won out, at least rhetorically. . . . . The victory was illusory.” (citation omitted)).
217. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761 (quoting McDonald, 335 U.S. at 456) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
218. Id. at 763 (noting officer safety and evidence preservation as exigencies that justify
a search of the arrestee or his area of control incident to his arrest).
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tions to the warrant requirement should be created through specific
factual circumstances rather than through bright-line standards.219
Justice Scalia’s evidence standard, however, justifies warrantless
searches incident to arrest on the ground of law enforcement’s interest in securing evidence rather than on the ground of exigent circumstances.220 Although purporting to abandon bright-line rules in the
search incident to arrest context,221 the Court’s adoption of the evidence standard may have incidentally created a new bright line that
defines the scope of the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights in the
search incident to arrest context solely by the offense for which the
arrestee has been detained. The arbitrariness of defining the right to
search incident to arrest by the offense of arrest is illustrated by a comparison of the facts of Gant and Thornton. In each case, the driver of
an automobile was arrested shortly after exiting his vehicle: Gant for
an outstanding warrant222 and Thornton for possession of marijuana
and crack cocaine found during a consensual pat down.223 Both Gant
and Thornton were handcuffed and secured in the back of a patrol
car at the time of the search,224 and the practical difficulty of obtaining a search warrant through proper procedures in each case was
219. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 464 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n
determining whether to grant an exception to the warrant requirement, courts should
carefully consider the facts and circumstances of each search and seizure, focusing on the
reasons supporting the exception rather than on any bright-line rule of general application.”); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (noting the Court’s “long-established recognition that standards of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not
susceptible of Procrustean application”); see also Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1419
(describing Chimel’s “straightforward, commonsense approach,” which was designed to ensure that “future developments [in the search incident to arrest exception] might be incremental, progressive, rooted in principle, and faithful to Fourth Amendment values”).
220. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“Belton searches are justifiable . . . because the car might contain evidence
relevant to the crime [of arrest].”). According to Justice Scalia, the “application of Chimel
in [the vehicular] context should be entirely abandoned.” Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct.
1710, 1725 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Scalia does not attempt to justify
his evidence standard using an exigency framework in either Gant or Thornton. Id. (“I
would hold that a vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso facto ‘reasonable’ only when the
object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another
crime that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred.” (emphasis added)); Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (justifying the evidence standard based on a “general interest in gathering evidence”).
221. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (“Accordingly, we reject [the broad] reading of Belton
and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”).
222. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1715.
223. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618.
224. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1715; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618.
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identical.225 Yet, because Gant was arrested for a traffic violation and
Thornton was arrested for a drug violation, the evidence standard prohibited the search of Gant’s vehicle while allowing that of
Thornton’s.226
While Belton’s bright-line was based upon the “generalization”
that an automobile’s passenger compartment was within the arrestee’s
area of immediate control,227 the evidence standard’s potential bright
line derives from Justice Scalia’s assumption that “it is not illogical to
assume that evidence of a crime is most likely to be found where the
suspect was apprehended.”228 Although the evidence standard requires that an officer have reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest, both Gant229 and Thornton230 suggest that
“reason to believe” can be found entirely in the nature of the crime of
arrest—that is, whether the crime of arrest is evidentiary or nonevidentiary.231 In fact, many state and lower federal courts applying Gant
225. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 755, 762 (1969) (“Only last Term . . . we emphasized that ‘the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20 (1968))). Indeed, the practical difficulty of obtaining a search warrant for an arrestee’s
vehicle has been drastically reduced by modern technologies such as cellular networks and
Wi-Fi, which allow police departments to keep officers connected while on patrol, allowing
officers to “communicate quickly with judges [and] obtain an arrest or search warrant
while monitoring the site of suspected criminal activity.” Ed Lee, Best Practices in Mobile
Data Communications, OFFICER.COM, http://www.officer.com/print/Law-EnforcementTechnology/Best-practices-in-mobile-data-communications/1$40887 (last visited Feb. 11,
2011). Requiring that police remotely obtain a warrant will take longer than automatically
allowing the search in every instance, but “the mere fact that law enforcement may be
made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.”
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
226. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (noting that “when a recent occupant is arrested for a
traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant
evidence”); Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (affirming
the search of Thornton’s vehicle because Thornton “was lawfully arrested for a drug offense” and “[i]t was reasonable . . . to believe that further contraband or similar evidence
relevant to the crime . . . might be found in the vehicle”).
227. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
228. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 630 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
229. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1719 (“[W]hen a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic
violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. [In other cases], including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a
basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
230. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In this
case . . . petitioner was lawfully arrested for a drug offense. It was reasonable for Officer
Nichols to believe that further contraband or similar evidence relevant to the crime for
which he had been arrested might be found in the vehicle . . . .”).
231. See Christopher D. Totten, Arizona v. Gant and Its Aftermath: A Doctrinal “Correction”
Without the Anticipated Privacy “Gains,” 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 1293, 1311 (2010) (noting that
courts applying the evidence standard may engage in a “categorical analysis” by “establish-
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have followed this approach of looking only to the nature of the crime
of arrest in determining whether a search incident to arrest is authorized under the evidence standard.232 And even if Justice Scalia’s assumption may “appear[ ] to be built on firmer ground” than Belton,233
it is questionable whether a defendant’s arrest for an evidentiary offense sufficiently indicates that evidence of that offense may be found
in the vehicle to justify a bright-line standard allowing a vehicular
search incident to arrest.234 By continuing to authorize searches incident to arrest when a defendant is arrested for an evidentiary offense,235 the evidence standard, itself resembling a bright-line rule,
continues to suffer from the same issues of arbitrariness as the Belton
standard.236
ing certain categories of underlying crimes that do or do not satisfy [the evidence standard]” while “neglect[ing] to examine the factual basis for the officer’s ‘reason to believe’
in particular cases.”). A nonevidentiary offense is “a crime which, by its nature, does not
give rise to cognizable grounds for concluding that evidence probative of its commission
might be found in the vicinity of the arrestee.” Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1452 n.222.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 625 F.3d 439, 444–45 (8th Cir. 2010) (“We have
previously distinguished cases . . . in which defendants were arrested for drug offenses
from Gant . . . because the former situation provides a reasonable basis for officers to
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest . . . .”); United States v. Leak,
No. 3:09-cr-81-W, 2010 WL 1418227, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 5, 2010) (using the evidence
standard to permit a vehicle search where the defendant was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon without discussing the specific facts of the arrest); Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d
671, 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he ‘reasonable belief that evidence might be
found’ prong of Gant can be satisfied solely from the inference that might be drawn from
the nature of the offense of arrest itself, and the assumption that evidence might be found
at the place of arrest.”); Daves v. State, No. 11-09-00075-CR, 2010 WL 3612520, at *3 (Tex.
Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2010) (declining to suppress the results of a search incident to a driver’s
arrest for narcotics paraphernalia based on the nature of the crime of arrest without discussion of the facts of arrest). But see infra note 300 (explaining that some lower courts
continue to apply a fact-based inquiry to determine whether there is reason to believe that
the vehicle contains evidence of the crime for which the arrestee has been detained).
233. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part); see also David S. Rudstein, Belton Redux: Reevaluating Belton’s Per Se Rule Governing the Search of an Automobile
Incident to an Arrest, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287, 1343 (2005) (“Justice Scalia’s proposed
rule is certainly built on firmer ground than the per se rule adopted by the Court in Belton.” (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)).
234. Cf. Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1463–64 (noting that in many cases, “the mere fact
of arrest tells us little, if anything, about the existence of seizable objects in nearby areas”).
Notably, Justice Scalia’s assumption is not supported by the search results in Thornton, the
case in which Justice Scalia first advocated for the evidence standard’s application. In
Thornton, the police officer found three bags of marijuana and one bag of crack cocaine in
the defendant’s pocket while searching him outside of his vehicle. Thornton, 541 U.S. at
618. Upon searching Thornton’s car, however, the officer did not find additional drugs
but did find a BryCo 9-millimeter handgun. Id.
235. Cf. Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1451 (describing the evidence standard as “[t]he
reaffirmation of Belton authority for ‘evidentiary’ offenses”).
236. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling
Belton’s bright-line rule “arbitrary”); supra text accompanying notes 222–26.
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The evidence standard also clashes with Chimel due to its potential to be used as a basis for police to make pretextual arrests in order
to search a suspect’s vehicle. A common criticism of warrantless
searches is that in abandoning the requirement for judicial pre-approval of the search, they give police officers incentives to undertake
fishing expeditions that, if successful in producing incriminating evidence, can be justified after the fact.237 Unlike Belton’s bright-line
standard, which allowed “purely exploratory searches,”238 the evidence standard may limit law enforcement’s ability to conduct vehicular searches on the basis of minor traffic offenses alone.239 The
evidence standard does not obviate the danger, however, that officers
may make arrests in the absence of probable cause for evidentiary offenses in order to search a suspect’s vehicle for incriminating evidence.240 It also does not eliminate the risk that police may engage in
a “constitutionally objectionable[ ] sort of rummaging” in an arrestee’s vehicle in order to obtain evidence.241
But Chimel’s heavy emphasis on the need for police to submit
their evidence of probable cause to a neutral magistrate before undertaking a search was largely based on the risk of pretextual searches.242
237. As Professor Tracey Maclin has noted, the warrantless search is a high-reward/lowrisk proposition for police. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 246 (1993) (discussing the potential for abuse inherent in the
warrantless search). If the search turns up evidence, then “probable cause can be easily
manufactured” in subsequent judicial proceedings. Id. If the search does not yield evidence, however, “the encounter can be quickly terminated and the officer and the individual will go their separate ways.” Id. This process incentivizes police to search based on a
variety of motivations, including “curiosity, the desire to hassle an individual, or as a device
to quickly assert the officer’s authority during a street encounter.” Id.
238. United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1999) (Trott, J.,
concurring).
239. See Rudstein, supra note 233, at 1343 (noting that the evidence standard “nearly
eliminate[s] the incentive for police officers to use a custodial arrest for a minor traffic
offense as a pretext to conduct an otherwise impermissible search of an automobile and its
contents”). Notably, however, at least one circuit has held that driving while impaired may
qualify as an evidentiary offense in certain circumstances. See United States v. Tinsley, 365
F. App’x 709, 711 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that police had reason to believe that evidence
of the crime of driving while impaired would be present in the vehicle). Driving while
impaired is thus one example of an evidentiary offense that may prove susceptible to abuse
as law enforcement and lower courts continue to apply Gant in practice.
240. Cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(observing that the evidence-gathering rationale for the search incident to arrest, which
forms the foundation of Justice Scalia’s evidence standard, would have the effect of
“mak[ing] the arrest an incident to an unwarranted search instead of a warrantless search
an incident to an arrest”), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
241. Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1463.
242. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761 (“‘And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass
on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home.’” (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)); id. at 767 (noting that “one result of deci-
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When an illegal search uncovers evidence, whether of the crime of
arrest or otherwise, the damage is done—while courts provide some
level of after-the-fact protection against unconstitutional arrests and
searches, the Chimel Court specifically noted that it considered the ex
post facto protection provided by courts to be insufficient.243 By allowing searches where it is wholly practicable for police to obtain a
warrant, the evidence standard, which resembles a bright-line rule,
undermines the principles underlying Chimel, creating inconsistency
within the Gant Court’s opinion.
2. The Evidence Standard’s Disregard for the Warrant Requirement Is
Inconsistent with the Historical Foundation of the Fourth
Amendment
The evidence standard is also problematic because it conflicts
with the history underlying the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches is not merely an
ordering of words to be read in a contextual vacuum, but must be
considered in light of the Framers’ intention to prohibit the practices
that sparked the American Revolution.244 The Fourth Amendment
was largely a reaction to the general warrants and writs of assistance245
that were detested by colonial Americans.246 Unlike Chimel’s exigency
standard, which recognized that in the absence of exigent circumstances, “the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between
the citizen and the police,”247 the evidence standard eschews the warrant requirement248 and leaves citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights
sions such as Rabinowitz . . . is to give law enforcement officials the opportunity to engage
in searches not justified by probable cause, by the simple expedient of arranging to arrest
suspects at home rather than elsewhere”).
243. Id. at 766 n.12 (“The Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply to redress,
unlawful police action.”).
244. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 69–70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing the Fourth
Amendment as “a safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as
to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution” and naming among these abuses unwarranted and unlimited searches).
245. A writ of assistance was a “species of warrant” common in colonial America that
“authorized [customs officers] to seize any goods which they suspected to be smuggled,
wherever found.” EDWARD CHANNING, A STUDENT’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 134 (2d
ed. 1912).
246. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761.
247. Id. (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
248. In the search incident to arrest context, the warrant requirement has typically been
understood to require law enforcement to obtain a warrant unless exigent circumstances
render the judicial process impracticable. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the warrant requirement’s application to the search incident to arrest context).
The evidence standard, however, allows for the judicial process to be regularly circum-
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subject to “the caution and sagacity of petty officers . . . acting under
the excitement” of an arrest.249 Any legitimate basis for the search
incident to arrest exception must be “supported by a reasoned view of
the background and purpose of the Fourth Amendment,”250 and in
this regard, the evidence standard is lacking.251
Justice Scalia equates the evidence and exigency standards to the
extent that “both Rabinowitz and Chimel are plausible accounts of what
the Constitution requires.”252 But unlike Chimel, both Rabinowitz and
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gant seize on the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable searches and seizures,”253
reading the prohibition independently from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant specifications.254 As Justice Frankfurter noted in his
Rabinowitz dissent, however, “[T]he framers said with all the clarity of
vented in the absence of exigent circumstances in situations where the arrestee is arrested
for an evidentiary offense. See supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text (illustrating the
evidence standard’s endorsement of a warrantless search in Thornton where no exigent
circumstances existed).
249. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464–65 (1932) (striking down a warrantless search and suggesting that the evidence-gathering rationale, which underlies the evidence standard, is insufficient to uphold a search incident to arrest); see also Tomkovicz,
supra note 78, at 1463 (observing that the evidence standard places “no significant limit on
the scope of the search,” allowing a “constitutionally objectionable, sort of rummaging”).
Chimel’s exigency standard, unlike the evidence standard, also conforms with the general
tenor of the Bill of Rights, which tends to protect individual liberties at the expense of law
enforcement convenience. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (granting protection against
self-incrimination and the right to due process); id. amend. VI (securing the right of criminal defendants to trial by jury); id. amend. VIII (prohibiting excessive bail and cruel and
unusual punishment); see also Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 82 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“By
the Bill of Rights the founders of this country subordinated police action to legal restraints,
not in order to convenience the guilty but to protect the innocent.”).
250. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760.
251. See Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1469 (“The balance that underlies Justice Scalia’s
effort to preserve Belton authority for evidentiary offenses, however, seems quite inconsistent with the core balance struck by the Framers of the Constitution.”).
252. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting also that “neither is so persuasive as to justify departing from settled
law”).
253. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
254. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the longstanding controversy
over the existence of a general warrant requirement); see also Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct.
1710, 1724 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“To determine what is an ‘unreasonable’ search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we look first to the historical practices the
Framers sought to preserve; if those provide inadequate guidance, we apply traditional
standards of reasonableness. Since the historical scope of officers’ authority to search vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain traditional standards of reasonableness govern.” (citations omitted)); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a
prior warrant for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are
‘unreasonable.’”).
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the gloss of history that a search is ‘unreasonable’ unless a warrant
authorizes it.”255 Justice Scalia notes that the “uncertain” history of
the search incident to arrest requires that “traditional standards of
reasonableness govern,”256 a view that ignores Justice Frankfurter’s
“gloss of history,” which implies a strong linkage between the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness and warrant requirements.257
While uncertain is probably a fair characterization of the history
of the search incident to arrest,258 Justice Scalia’s approach ignores
the broader context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that is essential to understanding the exception itself.259 This broader history
of the Fourth Amendment’s enactment—taking into account the experiences, understandings, and purposes of the men who drafted and
ratified the Fourth Amendment—does not justify the evidence standard’s disregard for judicial warrants and abandonment of the probable cause standard.260
The Fourth Amendment was enacted shortly after the Revolutionary War and was intended as a safeguard against the colonial abuses
that had prompted the colonists to sever ties with England.261 While
scholars disagree generally as to the reasons for the Revolution,262 one
255. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.
256. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring).
257. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[The Fourth Amendment]
was the answer of the Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches without warrants and
searches with warrants unrestricted in scope. Both were deemed ‘unreasonable.’”); see also
WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 781 (2009)
(“By providing a consensus against promiscuous, warrantless house searches that preceded
national existence, [the Continental Congress] had already established a constitutional
mandate against those searches before Adams, in 1780, furnished a terminology in the
word ‘unreasonable.’”).
258. See Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1460 (explaining that “the most accurate characterization of the history of the search incident to arrest doctrine would appear to be thenJustice Rehnquist’s acknowledgement that early authorities dealing with the topic are
‘sparse’ and ‘sketchy’” (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230, 232 (1973)).
259. Cf. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The test by which
searches and seizures must be judged is whether conduct is consonant with the main aim
of the Fourth Amendment.”).
260. See Tomkovicz, supra 78, at 1465–66 (observing that “[i]nsofar as it authorizes
searches of areas around arrestees on the mere assumption that evidence or contraband is
‘most likely’ to be there, the Rabinowitz doctrine that Justice Scalia attempts to resuscitate . . . seems inconsistent with this Fourth Amendment history and unfaithful to a core
principle that played a central historical role”).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 244–46.
262. See generally, e.g., HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 83
(1980) (discussing the role that large Loyalist landholdings played in incentivizing the
American Revolution); Marc Egnal & Joseph A. Ernst, An Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 3 (1972) (observing that while restrictive British economic measures were “one ostensible cause of revolt,” “the colonial reaction to them was
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significant viewpoint focuses on the discontent caused by the zeal with
which the British employed warrantless searches to enforce customs
laws and squash dissent in the colonies.263 For example, in Boyd v.
United States,264 “the first Supreme Court decision in which the
[F]ourth [A]mendment looms large,”265 the Court described a February 1761 debate266 that took place in Boston in which James Otis vigorously denounced the writ of assistance for giving revenue officers
unfettered discretion to conduct warrantless searches for smuggled
goods.267 John Adams would later declare that as a result of this debate, “[t]hen and there the child Independence was born.”268 In light
of the history of vigorous colonial objection to the general search,269 it
is more plausible that the Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment to
express a strong preference for specific, judicial pre-approval of
determined in large part by a growing concern for the economy and for economic sovereignty, a concern that only coincidentally reinforced the dictates of patriotic principle”).
263. CUDDIHY, supra note 257, at 574 (“In the decade before the revolution, Americans
perceived writs of assistance not only as a new and violent type of search but as part of an
effort by Britain to subdue them politically, for the press had associated general searches
with political oppression since [1763].”); id. at 779 (“In addresses to the American people
on 21 October 1774 and to King George III five days later, Congress had denounced the
power of the Commissioners of Customs ‘to break open and enter houses without the
authority of any civil magistrate founded on legal information.’”); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (“The [Fourth] Amendment was in large part a reaction to
the general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the colonists and had
helped speed the movement for independence.”); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145,
159 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing the abusive colonial search and seizure
practices “that more than any one single factor gave rise to American independence”),
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); infra note 266.
264. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute requiring noncriminal defendants in federal revenue cases to hand over to prosecutors
certain documents tending to prove the Government’s allegations, id. at 619–20, and
found that the statute violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, id. at 632.
265. TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 53 (1969).
266. The debate took place when customs officials applied to the Superior Court in
Massachusetts for new writs of assistance after their previous writs, issued by the colonial
governor, were found to be improper. CHANNING, supra note 245, at 134. James Otis, then
the king’s advocate for that region, resigned his post to oppose the issuance of the writs on
behalf of a group of Boston merchants. Id. Otis’s speech, “often and rightly regarded as
the first act in the American Revolution,” has unfortunately only been preserved in the
“fragmentary” notes of John Adams, at the time a law student in Boston. Id.
267. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625. Boyd identified this debate as “perhaps the most prominent
event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother
country.” Id.
268. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. See CUDDIHY, supra note 257 at 552 (“The American appetite for British legal critics
of [general] warrants grew as the revolution grew near, and books by those critics could be
found in libraries everywhere in America.”); id. at 775 (“In 1774, the Continental Congress,
voice of the united colonies, had thrice denounced general searches . . . not only because
they were general but also because they were warrantless.”).
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searches270 rather than as a means to allow discretion to law enforcement officers under the banner of reasonableness.271
The Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for the search warrant was also informed by the watershed pre-Revolutionary English
case Entick v. Carrington,272 which the Court in Boyd described as “one
of the landmarks of English liberty”273 whose “propositions were in
the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment . . . and were
considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.”274 Lord Camden’s judgment in Entick
clearly anticipated a prospective, rather than retrospective, judicial
role in authorizing searches, reasoning that a search should include
“proper checks,” such as “requir[ing] proofs beforehand.”275 Lord
Camden further explained that “the want of [such precautions] is an
undeniable argument against the legality of the [search].”276 Significantly, Lord Camden explicitly rejected the “argument of utility, that
such a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence,” noting that even the strongest pretrial evidence does not rise
to the level of proof but is merely suspicion.277
By focusing solely on the history of the search incident to arrest,
Justice Scalia conveniently avoids the broader picture—that is, the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant preference and probable cause requirement.278 In permitting warrantless searches in situations where an ar270. Cf. id. at 775.
271. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (“The Amendment was in large
part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the
colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence.”); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[The Fourth Amendment]
was the answer of the Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches without warrants and
searches with warrants unrestricted in scope. Both were deemed ‘unreasonable.’”), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.
272. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765). Entick involved an action of trespass brought by
John Entick against Nathan Carrington and three compatriots for the destructive search of
Entick’s home in November 1762. Id. at 1029–30. Carrington executed the search under
the color of a general warrant authorized by the secretary of state, which identified Entick
as the author of “‘The Monitor or British Freeholder,’” a pamphlet which, according to
the warrant, “contain[ed] gross and scandalous reflections and invectives upon his majesty’s government.” Id. at 1031 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found the
warrant to be invalid, as the secretary of state did not have the power of a magistrate,
making Entick an early adjudication of the warrantless search. Id. at 1047.
273. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626.
274. Id. at 626–27.
275. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1067.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1073.
278. See Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1465–66 (asserting that “[t]here is no debate . . .
that the Framers did incorporate a probable cause demand as a vital safeguard against
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restee and the arrestee’s vehicle are secured and the acquisition of a
warrant is practicable,279 the evidence standard ignores the need for
judicial pre-approval of searches, which is one of Entick’s “proper
checks”280 and is strongly favored by the Fourth Amendment,281 in
favor of evidence gathering. Furthermore, the evidence-gathering rationale essentially reprises the “argument of utility” rejected in Entick.282 If, as the Court noted in Boyd, Entick’s principles are
explanatory of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable
searches and seizures,”283 then Justice Scalia’s concession that the evidence standard is “hard to reconcile with the influential case of Entick
v. Carrington”284 demonstrates the evidence standard’s lack of fidelity
to constitutional principles. In addition, the evidence standard’s
abandonment of the probable cause standard clashes with the Framers’ hostility toward general searches, which led to the explicit inclusion of probable cause in the Fourth Amendment.285 As the Court
noted in Boyd, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires consideration of the Revolutionary and pre-Revolutionary experiences with oppressive searches and seizures in analyzing the Amendment.286
Because the evidence standard ignores this instruction and focuses
unjustified searches of the sort that were conducted pursuant to general warrants and writs
of assistance”).
279. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text.
280. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1067.
281. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(“When the Fourth Amendment outlawed ‘unreasonable searches’ and then went on to
define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could
give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is ‘unreasonable’ unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.”),
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
282. Compare Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1073 (rejecting the “argument of utility, that such
a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence”), with Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (referring
to an “interest in gathering evidence relevant to the crime for which the suspect had been
arrested” to justify the evidence standard).
283. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626–27 (1886).
284. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
285. See infra notes 296–97 and accompanying text (discussing the evidence standard’s
use of the lower “reason to believe” standard rather than the more typical probable cause);
see also Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1465–66 (noting that the probable cause demand is a
“norm of reasonableness” motivated by the need to “show a certain level of likelihood that
a seizable item is located in a place before intruding on that place” and that by authorizing
searches “on the mere assumption that evidence or contraband is ‘most likely’ to be there,”
the evidence standard is “inconsistent” with and “unfaithful to a core principle that played
a central historical role”).
286. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624–25 (instructing that “to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the terms ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent
history of the controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England”).
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only on the history of the search incident to arrest exception, it is
unfaithful to the core principles favoring warrants and probable cause
for searches.
3. The Evidence Standard Is Not Supported by a Wide Body of Case
Law and Thus Will Bring Unnecessary Ambiguity to the
Search Incident to Arrest Exception
Justice Scalia’s evidence standard has only thin doctrinal support
and was largely created out of whole cloth through his concurring
opinion in Thornton.287 In fact, Thornton is the only case that the Gant
Court cites to support the evidence standard.288 The concurring
opinion in Thornton does not add much to the evidence standard’s
foundation, primarily citing to Rabinowitz,289 which itself is “hardly
founded on an unimpeachable line of authority” and was overruled by
Chimel.290
As additional support, Justice Scalia mustered a collection of
cases predating Weeks’ exclusionary rule that have little persuasive
value in the search incident to vehicular arrest context.291 There are
two periods of particular relevance to analysis of the search incident
to arrest exception. The first, as surely Justice Scalia would agree, is
the founding period, when the Fourth Amendment was conceived
287. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1731 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (remarking
that the evidence standard was “take[n] uncritically from Justice Scalia’s separate opinion
in Thornton”).
288. Id. at 1719 (majority opinion).
289. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (using Rabinowitz
to illustrate that the “more general sort of evidence-gathering search is not without
antecedent”).
290. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760, 768 (1969) (“It is time . . . to hold that on
[its] own facts, and insofar as the principles [it] stand[s] for are inconsistent with those
that we have endorsed today, [Rabinowitz is] no longer to be followed.”). Indeed, while the
Court vacillated between the exigency and evidence-gathering rationales in its early search
incident to arrest jurisprudence, see supra Part II.A, Chimel has now served as the basis of
the Court’s jurisprudence on this topic for forty years. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (rejecting an interpretation of Belton that would “untether the rule from the justifications
underlying the Chimel exception”); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981) (explaining that its holding “in no way alter[ed] the fundamental principles established in the
Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests”);
Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1419 (“The majority opinion in Chimel v. California acknowledged the somewhat inexplicable vacillations in search incident law and tried, mightily, to
inject rationality and stability. A unanimous Court seemed determined to anchor the doctrine with weighty constitutional rationales that would enable it to withstand the next, inevitable shift in wind direction.”).
291. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629–30 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing to
numerous pre-Weeks cases supposedly “referring to the general interest in gathering evidence related to the crime of arrest with no mention of the more specific interest in
preventing its concealment or destruction”).
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and adopted.292 The second is the period subsequent to Weeks when
“virtually all” of the Court’s jurisprudence on the subject of unreasonable searches and seizures was developed—primarily because of the
strong incentive that the exclusionary rule gave defendants to litigate
Fourth Amendment claims.293 Thus, cases from the post-founding,
pre-Weeks period, in which a court in a criminal case would not permit
“a collateral issue [to] be raised to ascertain the source [of competent] testimony,”294 lack vitality in comparison to modern cases in
which Fourth Amendment issues are fully litigated. For these reasons,
the Gant Court’s significant alteration of the foundation of the search
incident to arrest exception through the addition of the evidence
standard demands a doctrinally stronger ground than that provided
by Justice Scalia.
One of the failings of a standard with thin doctrinal support, like
Justice Scalia’s evidence standard, is that there is no body of case law
addressing the various issues that the standard will raise.295 When is it
“reasonable to believe” evidence might be found in the vehicle, and
why did the Court not adopt the probable cause standard296 that officers must meet in order to make an arrest or obtain a search war292. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“To determine what is an ‘unreasonable’ search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we look first to the
historical practices the Framers sought to preserve. . . .”); cf. CUDDIHY, supra note 257, at
777 (“Iterating the amendment of 1789 via litigation seventy years hence is like describing
the New Deal Court of Chief Justice Hughes in the 1930s only through citations of its
leading cases by today’s Roberts Court.”).
293. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (“Because the rule requiring exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was first enunciated in Weeks . . ., it is understandable that virtually all of this Court’s search and seizure law
has been developed since that time.”); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 405 (noting that the exclusionary rule incentivizes defendants to litigate even the most trivial Fourth Amendment claims).
294. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 396 (1914).
295. Indeed, both the majority opinion and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Thornton
noted the imprudence of adopting Justice Scalia’s standard where neither the parties to
the case nor the courts below had an opportunity to address it. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624
n.4 (majority opinion); id. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (“I am reluctant to
adopt [the evidence standard] in the context of a case in which neither the Government
nor the petitioner has had a chance to speak to its merit.”). This deficiency was hardly
remedied in Gant, as Gant’s brief addressed the evidence standard in a mere three out of
forty-eight pages and Arizona’s brief devoted only a footnote to it. Brief of Respondent at
45–47, Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 07-542) (discussing the evidence standard’s application
to Gant’s case but not its general merits); Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 36 n.4, Gant,
129 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 07-542) (rejecting the evidence standard). The parties’ scant treatment of the evidence standard, however, dwarfs that of the lower courts in the Gant litigation, which did not address the issue at all. See supra Part I.
296. E.g., Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1731 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Why, for example, is the standard for this type of evidence-gathering search ‘reason to believe’ rather than probable
cause?”).
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rant?297 Does an officer’s “reason to believe” that an arrestee’s vehicle
may contain evidence of the crime of arrest flow from the specific
facts of the arrest or solely from the character of the offense?298 While
many state and lower federal courts have thus far followed the more
categorical approach,299 Gant itself does not provide direct answers to
any of these questions, leaving the doctrine potentially open to future
shifts and uncertainty.300 Further, while it may be relatively clear for
some offenses whether the vehicle could contain additional evidence,301 for other offenses such clarity is lacking with regard to this
threshold question.302
297. Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright
Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 312 (1982) (“[C]oncerning what is needed
to justify the making of an arrest or search, the answer in most situations is that quantum of
evidence which amounts to ‘probable cause.’”). Lower courts have so far interpreted “reason to believe” as requiring a lesser showing than “probable cause.” See, e.g., United States
v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that if “reason to believe” equated to
“probable cause,” then the evidence standard would be largely duplicative of the automobile exception).
298. Myron Moskovitz, The Road to Reason: Arizona v. Gant and the Search Incident to Arrest
Doctrine, 79 MISS. L.J. 181, 188 (2009) (noting that “[in Gant,] Scalia does not address”
whether “‘reason to believe’ flow[s] from facts other than the nature of the crime for which
the suspect was arrested”).
299. See supra note 232. Under this reading, as explained in Part IV.B.1, the Gant Court
may have incidentally created a bright-line rule that defines the scope of the arrestee’s
Fourth Amendment rights in the search incident to arrest context only by the offense for
which the arrestee has been detained. See discussion supra text accompanying notes
221–36. While recognizing this potential bright-line rule, this Section discusses the ambiguities that might result under the evidence standard because the Court failed to clarify
which interpretation of the evidence standard to use in its opinion.
300. See supra note 298; Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (stating only that it was adopting the
evidence standard from Thornton). Indeed, a split has already begun to emerge among
state and lower federal courts applying the evidence standard, with some adhering to the
categorical, bright-line view and others demanding particular facts to justify the reasonableness of an officer’s belief that the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest. Compare Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671, 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he ‘reasonable belief
that evidence might be found’ prong of Gant can be satisfied solely from the inference that
might be drawn from the nature of the offense of arrest itself . . . .”), with United States v.
Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733–34 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (suppressing evidence found during a search incident to arrest because the officer “did not articulate any particularized
reason why he believed that Defendant’s vehicle contained evidence of DUI”).
301. For instance, traffic offenses often will not provide a reasonable basis to believe that
the vehicle contains relevant evidence. People v. Osborne, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 705 n.11
(2009) (“Traffic violations, such as driving on a suspended license . . . frequently provide
no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence.”).
302. For example, when evaluating offenses, such as the possession of a weapon, near
the vehicle, it is unclear whether it would be reasonable to believe that the vehicle contains
evidence of the crime of arrest. Compare United States v. Brunick, 374 F. App’x 714, 716
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the evidence standard did not justify a search incident to
arrest for possession of a concealed knife because no evidence found in the vehicle would
have been “probative of the offense for which Brunick was arrested”), with United States v.
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The evidence standard’s lack of pedigree is all the more glaring
because it will likely come to subsume the search incident to arrest
exception. As Justice Stevens noted in Gant, it will be a “rare case” in
which the Chimel-based prong of the vehicular search incident to arrest exception will allow a search, because police will be able to secure
the arrestee in most situations.303 The evidence standard, however,
could be used to justify warrantless searches anytime a person is arrested for an evidentiary offense.304 Justice Scalia’s evidence standard,
truly the holding of only a single Justice305 and lacking any considerable doctrinal pedigree, is the tail that wags the Gant dog. To paraphrase Chief Justice Rehnquist, Gant “retains the outer shell” of Chimel
“but beats a wholesale retreat from the substance of that case.”306
C. Instead of Replacing Belton’s Bright-Line with Justice Scalia’s
Evidence Standard, the Court Should Have Returned the
Search Incident to Arrest Exception to a Purely ExigencyBased Rationale
The Gant majority may have accepted Justice Scalia’s evidence
standard, with all of its attendant inconsistencies,307 as the price of
eliminating Belton’s bright-line interpretation and avoiding a plurality
opinion that would leave the governing rule uncertain.308 Thus, Gant
was likely less the result of constitutional principle than it was the
Leak, No. 3:09-cr-81-W, 2010 WL 1418227, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 5, 2010) (citing the evidence standard to uphold search of arrestee’s vehicle incident to arrest for carrying a concealed weapon). As discussed in Part IV.B.1, however, many courts appear to be
sidestepping the analysis here by concluding that it is reasonable to believe that evidence
of the crime of arrest exists in all cases where the crime of arrest qualified as an evidentiary
offense.
303. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 n.4.
304. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the manner in which the evidence standard resembles a bright-line rule).
305. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714, 1719 (twice refusing to adopt the evidence standard as
a holding, instead relegating it to a mere conclusion); cf. Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1451
(“Although [Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Thornton] expressed no specific agreement with any of Justice Scalia’s views [in Thornton], [his] dissatisfaction with the majority’s
expansion of Belton . . . indicates that [he] might well be inclined to join any effort to
reduce [Belton’s] scope.” (footnote omitted)).
306. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (describing the joint
opinion’s effect on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
307. See generally supra Part IV.B.
308. See Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1451 (discussing, prior to Gant, the possibility that
Justice Stevens might accept the evidence standard, without necessarily agreeing with it, as
a means of limiting Belton’s bright-line interpretation); see generally Adam Liptak, After 34
Years, a Plainspoken Justice Gets Louder, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010, at A12 (describing Justice
Stevens as a “master tactician” and insinuating that, over time, Justice Stevens has been
able to convince other Justices to join his opinions); cf. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J.,
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avoidance of a 4-to-1-to-4 split among the Justices.309 Instead of producing an opinion in which Justices Stevens and Scalia each swallowed
the bitter pill of endorsing the other’s views in order to defeat the
“greater evil”310 of the broad interpretation of Belton,311 the Gant majority should have accepted the risk of a plurality opinion and fully
restored Chimel’s exigency-based approach to vehicular searches incident to arrest.
A full restoration of the Chimel standard in the context of vehicular searches incident to arrest would ensure that the doctrine does not
return to a bright-line rule that fails to consider the particular factual
scenario surrounding a given arrest. Any creation of a bright-line
standard312 in the search incident to arrest context will be “illusory”313
because the infinite spectrum of factual scenarios presented in the
daily course of criminal arrests will “soon break[ ] down what might
have been a bright line into a blurry impressionistic pattern.”314 Unlike the potential bright-line application of Gant’s evidence standard,
however, an exigency-based approach requires the fact-intensive consideration of whether officer safety or evidence preservation concerns
justify a warrantless search incident to arrest.315 While Robinson reasonably eliminated the need for exigent circumstances in searches of
an arrestee’s person incident to arrest,316 the authority to search beyond the arrestee’s person depends on the scope of the arrestee’s area

concurring) (“It seems to me unacceptable for the Court to come forth with a 4-to-1-to-4
opinion that leaves the governing rule uncertain.”).
309. See supra note 308.
310. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring).
311. Indeed, Gant’s majority opinion is hardly passionate about Justice Scalia’s new rationale for a warrantless search, adopting it in a mere three sentences and citing only to
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Thornton for the rationale’s origin. Id. at 1719 (majority opinion); id. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“No other Justice . . . shares my view that application of Chimel in this context should be entirely abandoned.”).
312. See supra Part IV.B.1.
313. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to “any search for ‘bright lines’” as “illusory”).
314. Id.; see also supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing ambiguities in Justice Scalia’s evidence
standard).
315. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (noting that “[i]f there is no possibility that an arrestee
could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications
for the search incident to arrest exception are absent and [Chimel’s] rule does not apply”);
see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 465–66 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“When
the arrest has been consummated and the arrestee safely taken into custody, the justifications underlying Chimel’s limited exception to the warrant requirement cease to apply: at
that point there is no possibility that the arrestee could reach weapons or contraband.”).
316. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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of immediate control.317 By restricting searches incident to arrest to
the arrestee’s actual area of immediate control and requiring that
searches be limited by the existence of officer safety and evidence
preservation concerns, the Gant Court would have tied the search incident to arrest tightly to the factual circumstances that render the warrantless search permissible.318
An exigency-based standard is also more consistent with the
Fourth Amendment’s historical foundation because it places a high
value on the acquisition of a search warrant.319 The Chimel Court permitted only strictly limited searches of an arrestee’s person and area
of immediate control while requiring a warrant for more extensive
searches.320 By restricting the scope of warrantless searches incident
to arrest and overruling earlier cases that gave police the authority to
engage in broad searches rarely justified by probable cause,321 the
Chimel Court attempted to restore the warrant and probable cause requirements to their rightful place as core constitutional principles.322
Thus, the Gant Court should have issued a clarion restoration of
Chimel, even if in the form of a plurality opinion, instead of adopting
an inconsistent two-part standard that will encourage pretextual
searches and violations of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.
V. CONCLUSION
In Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court rejected the bright-line
interpretation of Belton that allowed police to search an automobile
317. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (authorizing searches only of
“the area from within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence”). The determination of the scope of an arrestee’s area of immediate control
will necessarily be a factual determination. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing “relevant factors” in determining the scope of an arrestee’s area of control).
318. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 (noting that “[t]he scope of [a] search must be ‘strictly
tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible” (alterations in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
319. See id. at 761 (emphasizing that “[i]n the scheme of the [Fourth] Amendment . . .
the requirement that ‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,’ plays a crucial
part”).
320. See id. at 763 (explaining that no evidence preservation or officer safety justification
exists for routinely searching rooms other than those in which the arrest occurs or even
closed areas in the room where the arrest occurs and that such searches will generally
require a search warrant).
321. Id. at 767–68.
322. See Tomkovicz, supra note 78, at 1419 (explaining that the Chimel Court was “determined to anchor the [search incident to arrest] doctrine with weighty constitutional rationales”); see also supra Part IV.B.2.
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any time that a recent occupant was arrested.323 While the Court was
right to relegate Belton’s bright-line to the dustbin of history,324 it paid
a high price for its victory. Perhaps due to a lack of support to enact a
full restoration of Chimel’s exigency standard, the Court instead
adopted Justice Scalia’s evidence standard as an additional justification for the warrantless search of a vehicle, which itself resembles a
bright-line rule.325 The evidence standard, however, is inconsistent
with Chimel’s exigency rationale326 and the Fourth Amendment’s historical foundation.327 Further, the evidence standard lacks precedential pedigree and, as a result, is unacceptably vague, providing those
who will have to apply it with little guidance regarding when a given
search comes within its purview.328 The Gant Court missed the opportunity to end the misguided attempts to apply a bright-line rule to the
context of vehicular searches incident to arrest by restoring Chimel’s
exigency-based standard,329 and future majorities will be left with the
task of returning the search incident to arrest exception to its proper
basis.

323. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009) (holding that “Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle” and concluding that “circumstances
unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle”).
324. See supra Part IV.A.
325. See supra Part IV.C.
326. See supra Part IV.B.1.
327. See supra Part IV.B.2.
328. See supra Part IV.B.3.
329. See supra Part IV.C.

